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The decision to declare a district for a specific cause is a critical policy
decision; making an area an official office park or designated cultural site means
it will attract specific types of residents and businesses and require specific
amenities. This paper reviews the impact of designating a cultural district
as a place-based policy, specifically by developing a measure of neighborhood
stability and applying a stress test of neighborhood stability in cultural districts
during the Great Recession. The model underpiniing the neighborhood stability
measure is an optimal stopping time model which frames neighborhood rents as
a Brownian motion with drift. This structure imposes minimalist assumptions
and develops two reduced form parameters which describe individual preferences
for how long to live in a neighborhood. This analysis is in the style of Alvarez
et al. (2015). The parameters are then used to test neighborhood stability, with
the result that neighborhoods designated specifically as cultural districts are far
less likely to experience negative stability (e.g., large amounts of residential out-
migration and thus shorter residency spells) with a causal effect size four times
larger than the effect size of a recession itself. However, such neighborhoods are
also more likely to experience an influx of newer higher income residents after
designation, implying the beneficiaries of the new stabilitiy may be those who
priced out the original creators of the neighborhood’s cultural capital.
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1 Introduction
Urban revitalization efforts have played a major role in the much-documented
millennial movement back to the city. (Couture and Handbury, 2017) One
of the common toolkits of the urban revitalization planner is the creation of
special districts, such as the Avenue of the Arts in Philadelphia or NoDa in
Charlotte. These designations are essentially place-based policies which then
serve as signals to entrepreneurs and potential residents that these districts are
the intended center of specific economic or social activities. Residents seeking
identity-specific (such as in gayborhoods) or industry-specific amenities (the
arts district) are more likely to settle in these areas due to the perceived bene-
fits of consumption and production agglomeration, respectively. As a particular
example, the Avenue of the Arts in Philadelphia was a major initiative on the
arterial Broad Street in the Center City District whose motivation was entirely
to condemn blighted housing in the district and replace it with creative indus-
tries to drive vitality in a new central business district. (Bounds, 2006)
Special districts are often loci for high rates of minority entrepreneurship,
and the designation as a district can act as a way to send a clearer signal to
new, less informed consumers about the neighborhood’s business and residen-
tial communities. This formal designation is thus a critical policy measure that
in a sense “brands” a neighborhood to potential consumers. A famous exam-
ple — the formal designation of the South Beach, Florida Gayborhood was a
landmark moment in LGBTQ+ migration into the region. While South Beach
was certainly a queer space before this designation by the city, new in-migration
from queer folks who were not South Beach residents remarkably increased after
designation. (Kanai and Kenttamaa-Squires, 2015)
However, such designations can also attract external, higher-income resi-
dents to previously unknown neighborhoods, causing pre-designation residents
to trickle out as rents and local amenity prices rise. Then, there is a classic
real estate investment cycle problem, where revitalization comes at the expense
of current residents. What sets this policy apart from other place-based policy
design is persistence of the special district amenity. The designation of a special
district is often more lasting than a passing place-based economic policy like
a tax abatement. (Ratiu, 2013) As a result, while an industrial park subsidy
displaces one generation of buyers, (Redfearn, 2009) cultural districting policies
could drive a more continuous rate of neighborhood turnover as the wealthiest
consumers within the relevant cultural group turnover the cultural district itself.
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(Kubrin and Ishizawa, 2012)
Then, the question of how “stable” designated cultural districts like Gaybor-
hoods, Chinatowns, or Arts Districts truly are is not a straightforward question.
On the one hand, one can argue that the designation acts as a time-persistent
amenity which anchors individuals of a specific “type” to that district. (Lee and
Lin, 2017, for more on persistent amenities) On the other hand, one can argue
that such districts because of their high profile after designation may tend to ex-
perience a consistently higher rate of instability as residents and entrepreneurs
remain in flux with new tastes, trends, and income brackets.
This paper investigates the question of designated cultural district (DCD)
stability, and evaluates whether designation as a special district comes at the
cost of long-term neighborhood instability. The extent to which the long-term
cost is desirable in the name of urban revitalization from a purely economic
standpoint (admitting the shortcomings of such an analysis) is then discussed.
I develop a reduced-form distribution to model the decision-making problem
faced by residents of a special district on considering when to leave the dis-
trict. The model frames leaving the district in terms of an optimal stopping
time problem with the operative decision being when to leave conditioned on a
stochastic process which models neighborhood rents (a Brownian motion with
drift).
I thus provide the following contributions to the field: (1) I develop a di-
rect corollary to results in unemployment dynamics to methods of neighborhood
choice. (2) I discuss the creation of a measure of neighborhood stability and
the challenges this posses. On this, I develop a measure which controls for indi-
vidual preferences by developing a measure of the “type” of an individual from
the model which gives contribution (1), allowing full identification of the impact
of neighborhood features on the resident’s expected lifetime in a neighborhood.
(3) I argue that designation as a cultural district contributes to robustness of
a neighborhood against exogenous shocks using the Recession as a case study,
extending expected resident lifetimes despite the shock by an effect size 3 times
as strong as the effect of the Recession itself. However, DCDs also likely raise
rents and price out previous residents, so it is an open question as to for whom
the neighborhood is more stable; the original creators of the culture of the dis-
trict, or new, potentially displacing forces.
This paper uses data from RentBureau, a credit bureau dedicated to the
multifamily industry which collects rental histories from a network of apart-
ment owners and managers. Individual rental terms are observed, including
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collections, rental amount, and final payment dates, as a census. This dataset
is available from January 1997 until June 2010.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide
further background on the DCD and literature which mirrors the methodologi-
cal choices of this paper. The theory and structure of the model is built out in
section 3, with some comments on the individual model provided in Appendix
A. Brief data summaries follow in Section 4. Section 5 provides results and dis-
cusses the development of a policy model which uses the individual-level reduced
form parameters to isolate the causal effect of DCDs on neighborhood stabil-
ity. I also develop a picture of what “neighborhood stability” truly means in a
measurement sense in this section. Section 6 summarizes our key conclusions.
2 Literature Review
New residents of a neighborhood who do not leave after the first year are more
likely to stay in the neighborhood for a long period of time. (Deng et al., 2003)
A marketer might suggest a loyalty effect sets in and keeps residents in their
neighborhood. The sociological anchoring effects of community back up this
explanation as a potentially causal story. (Temkin and Rohe, 1998) A game
theorist may argue that individuals arrive in neighborhoods with imperfect in-
formation, and that those who sort out in the first year are those who discover
that their information was incorrect to the point that the neighborhood was
suboptimal. (Anenberg, 2016) Both likely hold some grain of truth, suggesting
that the hazard rate of migration out of a neighborhood is a mix of heterogeneity
and duration dependence. This paper uses the labor model of an optimal stop-
ping time problem for hazard rates in- and out of unemployment and applies it
to the resident’s optimal out-migration time problem. We develop nonparamet-
ric decompositions of heterogeneity and duration dependence in the manner of
Alvarez et al. (2015). The predecessor to this paper, they frame the decision
to take a job as an optimal stopping time problem. They cast wages into a
Brownian motion with drift, and I intend to do the same with local neighbor-
hood rents. Their derivation also allows decomposition of the job-finding hazard
into heterogeneity and duration dependence, while developing a nonparametric
estimation for a paper of latent sufficient statistics. Studies of separation into
unemployment have used this structure to analyze whether recall expectations
(expectation of re-employment as in the case of a temporary layoff) muddle
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duration-dependent signals. (Nekoei and Weber, 2015) Generally, the nonpara-
metric mixed hazards model has been used with time-varying covariates because
it is quite easily identified. (Brinch, 2007)(Hobbs, 2015) The method across the
literature generally devises a structural evolution for key individual-level param-
eters, popularly including individual discount rates and some stochastic or fixed
formulation for reservation wages. Spinnewijn (2015) introduces biased beliefs
in to the classic two-period model of unemployment, obtaining sufficient statis-
tics from a modified Baily formula. He proves that in this setting identification
of two moments of the individual utility problem is sufficient for policy design.
Generally, sufficient statistics approaches estimate wage elasticity to a parame-
ter of interest, such as uninsurance benefit rates. (Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016)
The sufficient statistics is also quite present in the neighborhood choice liter-
ature, to which this paper makes its contribution. The search for such sufficient
statistics is in particular still a topic of discussion. Segregation levels, for exam-
ple, are not able to characterize racial sorting impacts on income and education.
(Bayer and McMillan, 2005) Wealth has been estimated to be a key driver for
neighborhood relocation and churn (in a model, notably, which does not ac-
count for multi-period savings or consumption). (Bayer et al., 2016) I argue
that generally, churn is a more apt sufficient statistic than rents alone in the
place-based policy literature because such policies tend to price out existing
residents and gentrify neighborhoods. (Givord et al., 2013) Indeed, rents pri-
marily benefit city government tax budgets and those who afford to own local
housing capital; gentrification imposes costs by pricing out non-owning, often
low-income, households, causing loss of efficiencies from accrued local knowl-
edge. (Shaw and Hagemans, 2015) Thus, quantifying churn is of major interest
when thinking about efficiency. A persistent threat of asset loss can impose
well-being effects and generally make individuals less likely to use credit, affect-
ing their ability to make own-optimal consumption choices. (Sakizliog˘lu, 2014)
Generally, measures of demand for skilled labor is sufficient to estimate tract
demographic, population skill-levels, and housing prices. (Edlund et al., 2015)
When analyzing impacts, on displacement, the sufficient statistics tend to come
from rents or are indirectly derived from a rent-based measure. (Liu et al.,
2017) (Furman and Orszag, 2015) This is the perspective this paper will adopt
and subsequently defend. This is consistent with literature on neighborhood
choice from other perspectives as well. For example, models of private provision
argue that an “impatience rate” can be viewed as the source of heterogeneity in
deciding to privately provide a public good. (Bhattacharya et al., 2017) Then,
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the individual level decision in the literature tends to be driven (akin to in the
labor literature) by two factors; a timing problem and a rent level.
The experiment in this paper is an impulse response (exogenous shock) ex-
periment which uses changes in hazard rates during a recession to test differ-
ences across neighborhoods. A study of the Great Recession on the long-term
unemployment rate uses a similar decomposition into duration dependence and
heterogeneity to compare pre-Recession and post-Recession hazards. (Kroft
et al., 2016) Another paper uses the exogenous shock of plant closures to deter-
mine whether there is a significant signaling effect in unemployment duration.
Their model is a simply proportional hazards specification with a single-term
estimator, however - not a fuller structural approach. (Becker and Jahn, 2015)
The final relevant literature is the discussion of the anchoring effect of cul-
tural districts. Amenities can act as anchors which fix neighborhoods to certain
income levels with less volatility over time when they are persistent. Empirical
results on the topic are mixed. (Lee and Lin, 2017) This paper questions whether
designating an area as a cultural district can act as an anchor point for higher in-
come members of the targeted communities. Actual empirical results are mixed.
An exercise in South Beach, Florida suggests that the queer community before
and after the designation of the gayborhood has become more dispersed, and
that queer entrepreneurs were gradually priced out by in-migrants from other
cities who have taken over the strip. (Kanai and Kenttamaa-Squires, 2015)
Theoretically, however, cultural districts like ethnic enclaves should promote
agglomeration by overcoming language barriers and work-rule differences in im-
migrant populations which result in underemployment in other neighborhoods.
(Kaplan, 1998) City planners have long discussed the merits and drawbacks
of anchor-based development which creates anchor institutions that can help
prevent fragmentation of communities after development. In the status quo,
however, the location of affordable housing is not correlated with proximity to
institutional and neighborhood amenities, where anchor-based revitalization is
targeted. (Silverman et al., 2015) This suggests that as an experiment, there is
indeed a clean treatment effect when considering specialty districts as possessing
potential anchors in the status quo, as opposed to neighboring districts.
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3 Theory
3.1 Individual Choice Problem
The individual i when choosing a neighborhood trades off consumption of a
housing good and other consumption. Greater expenditure on rents implies
lower expenditure on consumption, and with greater expenditure on rents tends
to come a higher utility from amenities (because one can spend more, access
is more likely to neighborhoods with tailored local amenities). This tradeoff is
not absolute a low rent can still lead to a decent value of amenities, so I adopt
the following relatively flexible utility function for the individual maximization
problem.
max
j
Uijt = cijt ·Ajt (1)
θit ≥ cijt +Rijt (2)
Ajt ≥ Ajt (3)
The last equation refers to the fact that individuals demand some world-
clearing nonnegative amenity value at minimum. For the purposes of this paper,
we assume that income is equivalent across neighborhoods j. This is obviously
not the case, as some individuals will have specific skills that only earn wages
in the vicinity of certain workplaces, but one can craft a skill-adjusted measure
of amenities to adjust for such a consideration. I assume away structure due to
savings so the model strictly excludes the possibility of borrowing. In such a
setting, the maximized utility should correspond to:
max
j
Uijt = (θit −Rijt) ·Ajt (4)
Imagine now the rent-setting problem. Developers charge the individual a
rent which should increase in the value of local amenities with a fixed baseline
price according to the land value of the neighborhood. A hedonic component
that should correlate with income also comes into play; individuals with higher
income are more likely to buy homes with the extra bathroom or bedroom. So,
willingness-to-pay for rent should adopt a potentially linear form that mirrors
the following
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Rijt = ωj + ωAAjt + ωθθit (5)
One can adjust for imperfect local competition by adding a markup to this
rent function which varies with land supply tightness (ρj) or a local cost of new
construction that might be connected to land use policies. This markup can be
absorbed by the coefficients and components of rent in (5).
Residents will therefore choose a neighborhood based on the amount of
amenity received for rent. Of course, if rents themselves are a function of ameni-
ties present, then we can obtain a marginal utility of amenities in a closed form.
max
j
Uijt = (θit −Rijt) · 1
ωA
(Rijt − ωj − ωθθit) (6)
∂Uijt
∂Rijt
=
1
ωA
θit − 1
ωA
(2Rijt − ωj − ωθθit) (7)
Then, individuals will choose to leave a neighborhood for some maximal
amenity (which drives a maximal rent an individual is willing to trade off be-
fore consumption gets undercut). The notation for this value is R¯ijt. Now we
borrow a convention from labor economics, however; individuals will not choose
a neighborhood unless it meets some minimal level of amenity (and, in turn,
rent), Rijt. This can correspond to some world-clearing price of a home, the
amenity value of the last neighborhood the individual was in, or some other
measure of an amenity floor. In labor economics, this is the benefit received
during unemployment. This is weakly greater than 0.
We tackle a system with N neighborhoods. In a neighborhood with an
amenity level Ajt, if an individual pays rent on housing of Rijt, denote the
present value of the neighborhood to the resident as E(A) − E(R). For con-
venience, we will drop the subscripts in this section, where the subscripts may
clutter the analysis. Then, individuals will move into the neighborhood as long
as E(A) ≥ E(R) and R ≤ θ for income θ. R is the lowest rent at which the
individual will live in a neighborhood. This rent is determined by A, the lowest
amenity value at which they will live in a neighborhood, assuming rents are in-
creasing in amenity value. The highest rent is given by R¯, corresponding to the
rent at which utility from consumption will start to decrease to a suboptimal
level if rent rises at a fixed amenity value. Structurally, each individual has an
8
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unobservable A and a (thus unobservable) reservation rent derived from this
amenity level. They also have an unobserved ceiling rent level, R¯.
3.2 Structure
An individual resident is in state j(t) corresponding to which neighborhood they
live in in period t. They experience a state-dependent stochastic process that
drives the evolution of individual potential rents over time:
d log(Rijt) = µj(t)dt+ σj(t)dB(t) (8)
for standard Brownian motion B(t). The residential state is described by
neighborhood and potential log rent. A worker can choose to enter a neighbor-
hood at some fixed cost ψ. Workers are risk-neutral with discount rate r > 0.
To ensure that the problem is well behaved, apply the condition r > µj(t) +
σ2j(t)/2 for each possible state j(t). If this is violated for some j(t), the expected
value of staying in this fixed neighborhood will be infinite. I discuss this restric-
tion further in the appendix, and derive subsequent results as well.
The resident will remain in a neighborhood while j(t) = j and Rijt < R¯, but
will churn out the first time this condition is violated. This condition is strict
as long as ψ is strictly positive. This encompasses an interpretation of vol-
untary movement, but a reinterpretation where developers have price setting
power will demonstrate the profits for the developer earns a profit Rijt −A (A
is the amenity level that is used to determine the reduced-form R, corresponding
to a level of utility from out-of-neighborhood amenities) and can attract new
residents for a fixed cost ψ - then, this can also capture forced eviction and
developer-driven mobility.
Residents are described by discount rate r, base amenity utility A, and the
parameter space governing the stochastic process for their potential rents. In
reduced form, we obtain two parameters, R and R¯. The distributions are en-
tirely arbitrary across the population.
To determine the length of residency, note that the residency will occur once
rents breach the lower threshold, R. The log-rent will follow the set stochastic
process and the residency spell continues until the log-rent breaches the upper
threshold, R¯. The residency spell is thus the first passage time of this Brownian
motion with drift, an inverse Gaussian with d.f.
9
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f(t, α, β) =
β√
2pit3/2
exp
(
− (αt− β)
2
2t
)
(9)
where α = µj/σj and β = (R¯ − R)/σj . The former varies over the reals,
while the latter is weakly positive. For nonnegative α, the resident almost surely
churns out of the neighborhood in question. But, if α is negative, they have a
probability e2αβ < 1 of leaving the neighborhood and therefore may never do
so.
The shape of the inverse Gaussian is fairly flexible. There are specific char-
acteristics that are worth noting. Hazards at move-in (t = 0) are always 0. It
achieves a maximum value at a finite time t, then declines to a long-run limit
α2/2. The expected duration of residency is β/α, with a variance of β/α3.
Asymptotically, the remaining duration of residency approaches 2/α2 (note this
can be larger or smaller than the expected residency time at move-in depending
on α, implying both positive and negative duration dependence on possible).
The flexibility of possible behaviors associated with a longer duration of resi-
dency allows modeling a dynamic selection problem, where developers in new
neighborhoods are likely to cater first to individuals with the highest reservation
rents, then the next group, and so forth.
This analysis will assume that parameters are time-invariant at first. One
can argue that heterogeneity in parameters across the population can be mod-
eled through unobserved (latent) parameters, and I explore these options once
I complete the discussion of testability.
3.3 Integration: From Individual Parameters to Neigh-
borhood Distributions
As with any model of behavior, this model must be falsifiable given data. If a
population is observed where each individual has some fixed structural param-
eters (r, ψ,A, R¯, µj , σj) and the reduced form parameters (α, β). If each indi-
vidual is only observed for a single residency in the neighborhood, the model
is non-falsifiable and thus non-testable. Why? Because a single-spell data-
point is perfectly explained by assuming that if d periods pass, then σj = 0,
µj = (R¯ − R)/d. This would imply α, β → ∞ and β/α → d. Unfortunately,
unlike in the labor literature, where one observes repeat unemployment spells
with nonzero probability the likelihood of observed two spells of residency in
the same neighborhood infrequent at best. Such individuals become part of a
10
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selection problem as they are likely to have stronger attachments to local com-
munities or resources than those who do not repeatedly enter a community.
This is where this paper diverges from the previous labor literature that has
informed the model thus far. Rather than estimating individual optimal stop-
ping times and hazard rates out of neighborhoods, we integrate the distribution
of optimal stopping times across all individuals in a neighborhood to deter-
mine what the neighborhood-level distribution of hazards looks like. We can
then estimate neighborhood-level survival functions rather than individual-level
hazards. Then, each neighborhood has structural parameters which are each a
distribution of individual-level parameters, (r, ψ,A, R¯, µj , σj) and reduced-form
parameters (α, β).
3.4 Testing the Model
Now, say we have a sample of residents of size M from neighborhood j whose
durations correspond to an observed vector ~t of dimension M . Each has some
set of structural parameters as above. Now, their reduced-form parameters are
drawn from a joint neighborhood-level distribution g. Then, the density for time
of residency (alternatively, the residency “spell”, to mirror the labor literature
language):
φ(~t) =
∫ ∫
f(~t, ~α, ~β)g(α, β)dαdβ (10)
This differs markedly from the approach of labor economists whose work
originates this model. Rather than identifying these individual-level parameters
with any fineness, this approach acknowledges this is not possible with repeated
renter data and pools across observations.
Allow φ(i) to denote the derivative of φ with respect to ti. From the func-
tional form of the residency spell duration identified in (9), these derivatives
satisfy:
φ(i) =
∫ ∫ ( β2
2t2i
− 3
2ti
− α
2
2
)
f(~t, ~α, ~β)g(α, β)dαdβ (11)
Equivalently,
2t2iφ
(i)
φ(~t)
= E(β2|ti)− 3ti + E(α2|ti) (12)
There is a degree of precision in the previous incarnation of this model that
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is lost in the aggregation process. Rather than having the ability to estimate
a distribution for α and β for the individual, this model must sacrifice the
individual-level inference. This is a quirk of residential data; the estimation is
unstable otherwise. However, the conditions for model testability are the same.
Both expectations in (12) must be nonnegative. For a constant hazard rate of
residency h, so that the density of completed spells is φ(~t) = h2e−h
∑Ij
i ti these
will be
E(β2|ti) = 3
∏Ij
i ti∑Ij
i ti
and E(α2|ti) = 2h− 3∑Ij
i ti
(13)
Then, E(α2|ti) violates nonnegativity when the sum of duration times across
individuals,
∑Ij
i ti < 3/(2h), or one and a half times the mean duration. Then,
constant hazard rates cannot be generated for just any set of residency spells.
If the constant hazard is now unfixed, with a distribution in the population
G, then the density of these completed spells is φ(~t) =
∫
h2e−h
∑Ij
i tiG(h). Then,
E(α2|ti) is negative if the ratio of the third moment of h to the second moment
is positive.
Each moment of the joint distribution of (α2, β2) can be obtained through
the kth partial derivative. I focus on this first moment of the joint distribution
as the litmus test of interest for the time being.
3.5 Nonparametric Identification
Again using the aggregated densities across individuals observed in the neigh-
borhood, I non-parametrically identify the joint distribution of (α2, β2) across
individuals. Identification is equivalent to identification of the joint distribution
of (|α|, β). The joint distribution of (α2, β2) can be nonparametrically identified
by comparing results across multiple neighborhoods with residents who experi-
ence a fixed vector ~t (with at least 2 residents being observed in each studied
neighborhood). One can compute the joint distribution gˆ(α2, β2) according to
ψ(α2, β2,~t) =
f(~t, α, β)gˆ(α2, β2)∫ ∫
f(~t, α, β)gˆ(α′2, β′2)dα′dβ′
(14)
This could be inverted to solve for this joint distribution gˆ(α2, β2). This test
should not depend on the sample ~t used to derive the distribution gˆ(α2, β2), a
fact which can be used to test sensitivity of the model.
Alternatively, in a more applicable estimation process which mirrors a New-
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tonian procedure, one can assume a starting distribution of types g(α, β). For
each of theses types, the model provides a density f(~t, α, β) which produces
the density of actual durations φ(~t). In a setting with finitely many types
N = card{(α, β)} and sets of durations T = card{~t}, this is the linear system
φ = F · g for likelihood matrix F : F ∈ MT×N and g ∈ RN a vector which
indicates the share of each type in the population. This gives φ, the vector of
share of each duration in the population. As long as F is invertible, the model
is identified. If we assume momentarily N = T (as the other cases will yield
many or no solutions), identification is a matter of the rows of the likelihood
matrix being linearly independent. As the density of realized durations for one
neighborhood is not a linear combination of the density of realized durations for
others, the model is identified. In other words, it is unlikely that direct linear
dependence is to arise in a highly randomized setting with a large variety of
duration types.
3.6 Decomposition of Changes in the Hazard Rate
Define F (t, α, β) =
∫∞
t
f(t′, α, β)dt′ as the fraction of type (α, β) residents with
spells longer than t periods. Then, the distribution of types among those same
workers is
g˜(α, β|t) = (1− F (t, α, β))g(sα, β)∫ ∫
(1− F (t, α′, β′))g(α′, β′)dα′dβ′s (15)
The density of residual move-out durations for a given type conditional on
the unemployment spell lasting at least t periods,
f˜(τ, α, β|t) = f(t+ τ, α, β|t)
1− F (α, β) (16)
Finally, then, the density of residual residency duration lasting at least t
periods is
fr(τ |t) =
∫ ∫
f˜(τ, α, β|t)g˜(α, β|t)dαdβ (17)
The expectation of this density will be denoted Dr(t). This can be computed
directly once the joint distribution of the reduced form (α, β) are identified.
Now, if we want to decompose the change in expected durations into the effects
of heterogeneity and duration dependence. The contributions of heterogeneity
and duration dependence are then:
13
13
Mishra: Studying the Neighborhood Stability Impact of Cultural District Designations
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
Dr(t)−Dr(0) =
∫ ∫ ∫ ∞
0
d
ds
(f˜(τ, α, β|t)g˜(α, β|t))dsdαdβ
=
∫ ∫ ∫ ∞
0
d
ds
f˜(τ, α, β|t)g˜(α, β|t) + f˜(τ, α, β|t) d
ds
g˜(α, β|t)dsdαdβ
=: Dh(t) +Ds(t)
A similar decomposition can also be constructed on the hazard rates. The
hazard rate h(t) =
∫ ∫
h(t, α, β)g˜(α, β|t)dαdβ. This decomposition gives a term
for structural duration dependence and a term for heterogeneity, respectively,
as:
hs(t) =
∫ ∫ ∫ t
0
d
ds
h(s, α, β)g˜(α, β|s)dαdβ (18)
hh(t) =
∫ ∫ ∫ t
0
h(s, α, β)
d
ds
g˜(α, β|s)dαdβ (19)
4 Data
Tenureship data is obtained from the RentBureau dataset. This Experian-
produced project contains payment and residency records for 13 years (1997-
2010) for an apartment companys residents across many zip codes. The data
includes rent amounts (which allows cleaner tests of a priori assumptions about
the stochastic process) and records of when a resident enters and exits their
apartment. The data also presents a detailed account of payment, non-payment,
and collections by month through the lease.
I provide a dataset-level histogram of survivals in the Figure (1a). Note that
survivals are censored at the two-year mark (24 months on the x-axis), so we
must develop a right-censoring correction. The histogram suggests that a large
number of individuals churn out at the two-year mark, but the truth is that
part of this large bar contains entries which have resided in their apartments
for at least two years, not exactly two years.
The second subplot compares survivals in the period of the Great Reces-
sion, defined to begin in September 2008, to those which occurred beforehand.
Offhand, we generally see the shapes as relatively similar, simply with fewer
observations during the recession. I also report the overall joint distribution of
pairs of tenures across neighborhoods in a surface plot in (2). Some key ob-
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(a) Histogram describing the universe-level
hazard function.
(b) Histogram comparing observations
which moved out before the recession to
those which moved out during the reces-
sion.
Figure 1: Descriptive histograms for resident move-out times in the entire uni-
verse of the dataset.
Figure 2: Joint distribution of pairs of tenure lengths (length of residency)
within zip codes.
servations: first, note the joint distribution is generally convex, which reflects
the declining hazard rate (likelihood to move out) at longer durations (ignoring
the peak at 24 due to right-censoring). Second, the joint density is noisy. This
does not appear to be primarily due to sampling variation. Rather, there is
clear persistence of a yearly tenureship dropoff as this is the likely duration of
the average rental lease. The extremely high joint frequencies of multiples of 12
suggests that this is being replicated in the data. This is very much an artifact
of the data, and it can be dealt with in two ways. The first; it can be smoothed
out using a spectral analysis technique. The second; it can be allowed to remain
as is and the model will simply be judged on the surface plot shown for measures
of likelihood. Both methods are discussed in the calibration section.
The dataset’s breadth includes several DCD zip codes which are used in this
study:
1. Atlanta: Gayborhood, 30318 and Chinatown 30341
15
15
Mishra: Studying the Neighborhood Stability Impact of Cultural District Designations
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2018
(a) Histogram comparing the length of stay
in zip codes marked as treatment areas
(TRUE) due to designation as cultural dis-
tricts to other (control, FALSE) districts.
(b) Histogram comparing log-rents in zip
codes marked as treatment areas (TRUE)
due to designation as cultural districts to
other (control, FALSE) districts.
Figure 3: Comparisons of tenure and log-rent distributions by allocated control
and treatment groups.
2. San Diego: Gayborhood 92103 and Chinatown 92104
3. Los Angeles: Gayborhood 90012 and Koreatown 90005 and 90006
4. New Orleans: The Garden District 70119
5. San Francisco: The Castro, 94114
6. New York City: Riverside District, 10069
7. Tampa: River Arts District, 33602
We use these cities as experimental areas, with the DCDs as treated zip codes.
There are 2391 zip codes in the total dataset, from which we extract 123 zip
codes. Of these, the zips listed above and any zip codes within a 2-mile catch-
ment (to catch proximity effects) are assigned as treatment. Each zip code has
an average of 1340 different residency records. To summarize, I present a simple
comparison of log rents and tenure distributions across treatment and control
groups in Figure (3).
Generally, there are some initially visible differences across designations in
both the tenureship distribution and the rent price distribution. Rent prices
appear to be less skewed slightly, in treated districts. The tenure time of a
resident appears to follow a similar decrease in skewness. Note that this runs
countervailing to an a priori presumption of decreased heterogeneity in treated
districts due to cultural similarity. In particular, a homogeneous district is likely
to have more unimodal, concentrated distributions. This is clearly not the case.
Further exploration and calibration may help to elucidate why this might be
happening. With the data in mind, we move to calibrating the model.
16
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5 Calibration
5.1 Testing Compliance
To look at whether the model is able to be fit onto the data, and further whether
it is rejected by the data for lack of falsifiability, I conduct a two-stage com-
pliance procedure. I first run two possible smoothing algorithms on the data
and discuss why I end up rejecting both methods. Then, I conduct the tests
described in 3.4 to obtain a complete picture of what subsets of the data can be
fit with the stochastic model.
High-Pass Filter I proposed using a filter in the frequency domain (es-
sentially a high-pass filter around the annual frequency to penalize excessive
changes in slope) to target one of the specific causes of the noisiness of the em-
pirical data. The second proposal comes from Alvarez et al. (2015), which is
the use of a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
I start with the Fourier analysis approach. Taking the Fourier transform and re-
moving the annual component of the data results in the transformation shown
in Figure (4). Recall the original histogram shown in (3a) for a comparison.
The filtering operation essentially wipes out most of the noise corressponding
to the peaks at 12 months and 24 months (minus the right-censoring effect at
24 months), though the semi-annual peaks are still present (as we do not filter
out in six-month increments). The data captures the essential patterns of the
original histogram without being too noisy. However, cutting out some of the
frequencies in the upper range has also left some of the other information out of
the final analysis; the histogram is less granular and I believe the filtering leaves
too simplified a model in place. In fact, the slope after the first year shows why
this filtering operation cannot stand; it is far too steep a dropoff and far too
deep of one as well. The time domain has lost too much information in the
process. Raising the high-pass filter barrier does not fix this problem.
Hodrick-Prescott Filtering The second option, the Hodrick-Prescott filter,
was used in the study which precedes this paper. It has come under immense
scrutiny for similar reasons behind the rejection of the high-pass filtering exercise
above; it simply cleans up the data too much to the point that trends which
may be spurious become emphasized. From (5), this seems to be exactly what
results. In particular, the filter essentially creates a clean sine wave out of the
17
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Figure 4: High-pass filtered histogram of frequency of moves.
Figure 5: Hodrick-Prescott filtered histogram of frequency of moves.
data. This clean functional result is interesting in its own right, but may lead
to an easy overfitting by most models and makes the censoring corrections less
easy to conduct. The filter embeds this information directly into the trendline,
so using the trend seems disingenuous.
I rejected both of these procedures before conducting the analysis, and the
following two sections discuss alternate ways of ensuring the data is workable
while making fewer assumptions about the validity of parts of the data or where
the information in the data exists. A carte blanche filtering operation is likely
too liberal given that the structural model already places an assumed stochas-
tic structure on the model, but it was important to discuss given preceding
literature.
5.2 Optimization Procedure
As is by now clear, the data is not clean enough for a simple pass through an
off-the-shelf convex optimization procedure. I detail the process of finding a
minimum-distance estimator here. First, argue that for a neighborhood with
unspecified numbers of residency records, we can obtain a robust estimator of
the aggregate density function of αj and βj , g, by estimating gˆ on a subset of the
possible residency data-points. Rather than using all of the data-points in each
18
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neighborhood then, we sample 30 timings from each neighborhood (the cutoff
from the common rule derived from the central limit theorem) and estimate gˆ in
this space. Note that the density at this point should be relatively stable, and
that we should expect to estimate the same density save some sampling variation
for various subsets of 30 residency spells. Then, this mirrors the practice of
truncating variable-timespell panel data before analysis to a common timespell,
but with a sample size across observation areas.
The data exists as some distribution φ(~t) ∈ D(R30+ ). The distribution of our
parameters, g ∈ D(R30+ ) can be constructed as:
φ(~t) =
∫ ∫ 30∏
i=1
f(ti, α, β)g(α, β)dαdβ (20)
for every such ~t ∈ R30+ ). This is an inner product, so φ = Fg for positive,
linear F . This is a likelihood function; it is essentially an M × N positive
matrix whose columns add to 1. Each entry, Fi,j is the probability Pr{t1 ∈
(t1(i), t1(i) + dt], t2 ∈ (t2(i), t2(i) + dt]|(α, β) = α(j), β(j)}.
Then, the objective function of the quadratic optimization problem which falls
out of the procedure is
min
g∈∆N
‖Fg − φ‖ (21)
where ∆N is the distribution of possible types (α, β). To compute g consider
the following pre-processing measures.
1. Symmetrize the likelihood so that φ(t1, t2) is the average of the density of
(t1, t2) and (t2, t1).
2. The grid for α is entirely positive as we can only identify the absolute
value of α.
3. Calculate the likelihood at the final bin as the right-censored likelihood;
the likelihood of a residency time greater than or equal to 24 periods.
4. Relax the problem so that we do not require g to have only positive el-
ements and the constraint that the elements sum to one. Scale positive
elements of g and have them sum to 1 so that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions will be satisfied after an iteration.
5. Throw away pairs of (α, β) with density below 1 basis point.
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We do not require some of the other algorithmic constraints in Alvarez et al.
(2015) because of the right-censoring of the data (25 is a relatively low dimen-
sionality for number of periods). The above, particularly symmetrization, are
required to avoid some of the pitfalls of the noisiness of data.
6 Results and Discussion
6.1 Summary of Model
I compile the overall results in (1), aggregating datapoints regardless of treat-
ment, including those assigned neither control nor treatment. The table is
replicated for control and treatment groups. At first glance, the three estimates
do not appear to differ heavily. I briefly discuss these statistics, though com-
parison of the overall statistics masks local dynamics and local comparisons.
Generally, there is not excessive heterogeneity; the standard error of α and β
is not particularly high compared to the mean in any of the groups. However,
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the mean stay itself; standard errors
are generally twice the mean. Note that the mean stay in the treated areas is
about half a year longer in raw value.
The cross-sectional variance of the mean duration is also not strongly variable in
aggregate; it is around 40 in each group, with the standard error being around
16 (18 amongst the treatment group). The proportion of the variation in real-
ized durations due to individual variation is then around 40 percent (43 percent
in the treatment group). The asymptotic duration of a residency spell is about
7.5 months in control areas and 8.2 months in the treated areas. Then, if the
individual has lived in an area for a significant amount of time already, there
is a negative duration dependence (e.g., they are expected to stay longer the
longer they have already stayed). This timeframe is one-third of the total time-
frame observed for each record, suggesting the duration dependence effect is
quite strong in our data.
I show the fit of the mean type across all neighborhoods on the durations
histogram for all observations in New Orleans in Figure (6). The fit is not the
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E(α) E(β) E(β/α) Std(β/α)
0.726 5.91 8.768 16.392
E(2/α2) E(β/α3) Std(α) Std(β)
7.723 41.145 0.326 2.053
Table 1: Means of several key statistics across all neighborhoods, across all time
periods.
E(α) E(β) E(β/α) Std(β/α)
0.738 5.832 8.531 16.161
E(2/α2) E(β/α3) Std(α) Std(β)
7.566 39.664 0.3412 2.153
Table 2: Means of several key statistics across control regions, across all time
periods.
best here (nor should it necessarily be), but notice that the symmetrization has
caused the mode to ignore some of the nonstationary behavior around the 12th
month of residency. Then, the convex optimization procedure has produced a
principled, not overfit, model.
Figure 6: Fit of mean probability distribution (orange) on the New Orleans
aggregated data (blue).
A sample likelihood surface is shown in (7). Clearly, the likelihoods for
individual values has a fairly regular shape after the pre-processing above is
conducted. This suggests the calibration is comfortable.
In an assessment of the goodness of fit, the city-level fits had an average
chi-square p-value of 0.403, implying we can comfortably accept the model as a
good fit. The variance on this statistic across neighborhoods is 0.199, suggesting
that we are generally comfortably within model acceptance standards across the
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E(α) E(β) E(β/α) Std(β/α)
0.672 5.921 9.004 18.392
E(2/α2) E(β/α3) Std(α) Std(β)
8.173 44.108 0.343 2.180
Table 3: Means of several key statistics across treatment areas, across all time
periods.
Figure 7: Surface plot of a sample likelihood.
data.
The asymptotic duration shows differential responses to rent across assignment
as well. Designated cultural districts tend to have a higher estimated asymptotic
duration in wealthier neighborhoods as compared to control groups, suggesting
in particular that treatment groups are likely to be income-sensitive. This sug-
gests one of two things is occurring: (1) areas which are of a higher income
before designation are more likely to be designated or (2) designated cultural
districts are more likely to attract high income residents upon treatment. While
we do not have data on this, the inclusion of immigrant communities like Chi-
natowns and Koreatowns and a Little Puerto Rico seems to suggest that (2) is
the more likely explanation, as such communities are generally more likely to
have settled with a lower income. Higher-rent treatment areas also generally
demonstrate lower proclivity to have heterogeneity, suggesting areas homogenize
as these new arrivals enter the neighborhood.
Variance Decomposition I now conduct the exercise described in the the-
ory section which decomposes residual duration of residency into a component
explained by the heterogeneity in residents and one explained by duration de-
pendence (negative in this case). Again, I start by comparing these in the overall
dataset for all periods. Figure (9) compares these. Generally, heterogeneity ap-
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Figure 8: Comparison of effect of increasing rents on the projected asymptotic
duration of a neighborhood .
pears to explain a larger component of the asymptotic variance of residency
across neighborhoods.
Figure 9: Comparison of durations explained by heterogeneity and duration
dependence across the entire dataset.
I map the differences across treatment and control groups by comparing
the proportion of variance explained by duration dependence as asymptotic
duration dependence increases. These are simple linear estimators. See that
the treatment groups tend to have a larger positive duration dependence after
the first year, implying that once the first year has passed, the neighborhood
is estimated to extract significant more loyalty effects from residents. This also
implies that most of the heterogeneity “shakes out” during the first year - as
this is when the proportion of variance attributed to heterogeneity is at its
highest point - suggesting a compositional sorting of unlike types out of the
neighborhood after the first year.
Yearly Cohorts In the next section, I discuss isolating comparisons to same-
year and same-city treatment-control groups, whereas the statistics reported in
this section are all pooled. This was done because the results in this section are
able to share statistical strength across experimental groups, which overcomes
the smaller sample size of the treatment group relative to the controls. The next
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Figure 10: Increase in variation attributed to duration dependence with increas-
ing estimated asymptotic duration in treatment and control groups
section is certainly more sample-dependent, so I use bootstrapped variances and
standard errors while reporting.
I report the summary statistics of these yearly city-level cohorts in a style mim-
icking the tables above here in table (4).
E(α) E(β) E(β/α) Std(β/α)
0.7827 5.805 8.280 12.152
E(2/α2) E(β/α3) Std(α) Std(β)
7.017 36.508 0.312 1.902
Table 4: Means when calculated in year and city-specific pools.
The estimated values of the raw pools are fairly similar, indicating our pooled
analysis was likely a decent approximation of the true underlying patterns. In
particular, proportion of variance attributed to heterogeneity remains around
40% and the standard errors are similar on most counts.
6.2 Neighborhood Stability: Causality
Thus far, much of this paper has been a replication of the previous work of
Alvarez, Borovickova, and Shimer. The novel contribution of the previous sec-
tions was simply a matter of building a context for the application of their model
within the experiment of residency spells and neighborhood choice. I now con-
tribute the second novel piece of this paper, the application to measuring the
effect of a designated cultural district’s anchoring amenity on the hazard rate
out of a neighborhood. I will use this to test whether cultural districts have a
24
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significant impact on out-migration during an overall period of increased out-
migration, the Great Recession. While the previous sections present enough
nuance to develop some conclusions about potential impact of DCDs on neigh-
borhood stability, a more causal argument is possible given the Recession as
an evenly applied exogenous shock (though perhaps not evenly deep across its
application, as some cities and zips were hit harder than others - more on this
momentarily).
Defining “Neighborhood Stability.” The distribution g(α, β) encapsu-
lates and expresses in reduced form the distributions of neighborhood-aggregated
individual parameters, (r, ψ,A, R¯, µj , σj). The model for the anchoring effects
are simple. Then, we can use measures from our reduced form analysis as
individual-level terms. In particular, we can define a notion of neighborhood
stability if a neighborhood tends to attract individuals for a longer period of
time (conditioned on them staying for some mean duration - this is the defini-
tion of the asymptotic duration quantity reported in this paper). Note that by
using this definition of asymptotic duration, we can be flexible on a cutoff by
neighborhood; if a neighborhood has a lower baseline mean duration, it can still
have a high asymptotic duration for individuals who survive that mean dura-
tion. This is a good measure of stability because it emphasizes two points: (1)
local tunability, and (2) robust estimation of heterogeneity across individuals.
However, it faces a critical flaw; there is no estimator for people who wish to
leave a neighborhood but cannot due to the fixed costs associated with moving.
Put more succinctly, it does not capture financial entrapment.
We can use the asymptotic duration as a measure of neighborhood stability
with an important caveat. Asymptotic duration of a residency spell may be
significantly determined by wealth of an individual, as wealthier residents are
less likely to be priced out. This poses a problem as to whether the neighbor-
hood’s amenities are a causal force for the outcome of stability or whether the
individuals they attract are; attracting more stable individuals might be less
attractive as an indicator of neighborhood stability as it is more subjective to
time-varying tastes. Then, it is difficult from our data alone to identify the
source of stable neighborhoods as a demand-side or supply-side push, but we
can identify stability itself with some degree of comfort.
Arriving at a Causal Model. Design a simple model of difference-in-differences
which assesses how well treated (DCD) neighborhoods weather the impulse
25
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shock of the Great Recession
2
α3jk
= c(j) + τk + δ0DCDj + δ1Rk + δ2RkDCDj + γPj +  (22)
where c(j) is a city-level fixed effect that captures spatial differences in
tenureship patterns, and τk are differences caused by time dynamics which do
not get captured in evolving individual traits. R is the variable representing
the onset of the recesison. k is a cohort-level subscript, to account for changing
distributions over time. Cohorts are defined as individuals who move into a
zip code in the ssame year for the time being. I capture expectation of local
amenities and local conditions through the logarithmic mean of rent prices, Pj
for the time being; though it is an imperfect measure far and away, it is highly
correlated with most local amenities. (Lee and Lin, 2017) In this way, it forms
a natural fixed effect measure for zip-code level variation. Then, δ2 serves as a
fully identified difference-in-differences measure after local fixed effects are taken
into account. I argue this differencing is necessary primarily due to the use of
rent alone as the controlling covariate. I report the coefficients in table 5, as well
as some associated measures of the model’s appropriateness and goodness of fit.
The difference-in-differences estimator is not significant in this regression; the
treatment with designation does not significantly protect individuals from the
effects of the recession on their asymptotic duration. Interestingly, the recession
is also not particularly significant in this regression. However, the coefficient on
the treatment effect is significant at the 10% level. This is interesting in the
sense that it reinforces the significance of the treatment, but it does not tell us
that the treatment itself is a causal response in the face of a recession.
I try two more models which are somewhat nested by this model. The first
removes the time dummies to test whether they are too redundant given inclu-
sion of the recession variable. The condition number of the covariance matrix
for the first model is particularly high, suggesting the time dummies (largely
insignificant, admittedly) are too collinear with the recession variable given the
sample size. The second variation on the model also eschews time dummies.
This version further relaxes the assumptions of parallel slopes (already partially
satisfied by the inclusion of a rent-correlated fixed effect). Heterogeneity in the
neighborhood might be an important source of information as neighborhoods
which are less uniform in their responses to shocks will have different outcomes
post-recession.
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Looking at the model reports in Appendix B suggests the mosts viable model
from a log-likelihood perspective is that without time controls but with a control
for heterogeneity. This model suggests that in fact, the DD estimator and the
estimator for the treatment area both amount to an insignificant effect. The
heterogeneity, however, dominates this regression. This suggests that an uncon-
ditional analysis of the asymptotic residency duration relies primarily on the
heterogeneity of the locality.
I present one final causal analysis, in which I conduct a two-stage procedure.
In stage 1, I regress the asymptotic duration on the estimated mean E(β/α) of
residency spell types in the zip code within cohort k:
E(2/α2) = ζE(β/α) + κ (23)
In this case, we know the slope of this regression, but variation κ can be entirely
attributed to non-individual effects on the asymptotic duration. In other words,
conditional on the type of the individual, I extract the component of asymptotic
duration whose variance is not explained by any measure of individual prefer-
ences for neighborhood features. This measure κ I now regress against the same
second-stage linear model as performed best in the previous analysis:
κ = c(j) + δ0DCDj + δ1Rk + δ2RkDCDj + γ1Pj + γ2h
h
j +  (24)
By this, I suggest that these uncorrelated components of the asymptotic du-
ration are determined by zip-level added “loyalties” derived from homogeneity,
local affluence, local culture, and the city itself. This model is not comparable
off of log-likelihood to previous models as it is not nested. However, notice that
here the recession now has a direction that intuitively makes sense - it decreased
the de-individualized component of asymptotic duration by 0.25 months on av-
erage, significant at 10%. The DD estimator is now nearly significant at 10%,
with an increased expected asymptotic duration of 0.81 months. This suggests
that the effect of a designated cultural district must be de-individuated. In par-
ticular, the component of variation corresponding to an individual’s type when
conditioned strengthens the linear model overall, including significance of local
fixed effects.
The interpretation of this final model is that individuals have some baseline
taste for amenities and rents, α which determines their individual type as in our
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original model. To isolate how a local neighborhood affects individual decision-
making on the margin, we must control for their individual tastes for that neigh-
borhood in the first place, represented by this calculated type, and look at how
the residual varies with observables.
7 Conclusion
Cultural districts when designated may significantly increase the lifespan of a
neighborhood in the face of a recession, if only marginally in effect size. The
cultivation of this type of loyalty can have significant effects on city budgets in
moments of crisis by increasing the likelihood of having a stable tax base, and
can further drive longer-lasting city growth. This analysis suggests a complexity
to the narrative of the designated cultural district. DCDs make neighborhoods
more robust to productivity shocks, in a manner which is masked when they
are considered in aggregate. The income dynamics of designation are yet unex-
plored, however. It is clear that designated cultural districts upon designation
tend to drive up rents and attract potentially wealthier individuals, which in
turn helps drive increased asymptotic duration in such localities. However, it is
unclear whether displacement from DCDs after designation may actually drive
out the highest-loyalty residents; the counterfactual result on neighborhood sta-
bility around designation is unclear. A future analysis comparing designation
and non-designation in addition to the DCD versus the average city district may
resolve some of this causal tension.
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A Expanding on the Individual-Level Problem
With the given stochastic process for rents, the present value of rents will satisfy
the Bellman-Jacobi-Hamilton equations:
rEj(R) = exp(R) + µjE
′
j(R) +
σ2j
2
E′′j (R) ∀R (25)
The solution of this set of parallel equations across all neighborhoods, r,
rEj(R) =
exp(R)
r − µj − σ2j /2
+
N∑
k=1
uk exp(λjkR) (26)
where the poles have opposite sign and are the roots of the N -dimensional
equation r = λj(µj + λjσ
2
j /2). A solution to this equation should also satisfy
the equations:
Rijt < R¯ijt (27)
Ej(R) = Ek(R) ∀k 6= j (28)
Ej(R) = Ek(R) + ψ ∀k 6= j (29)
E′j(R) = E
′
k(R) ∀k 6= j (30)
E′j(R¯) = E
′
k(R¯) ∀k 6= j (31)
(32)
The conditions require value functions to be continuous and differentiable at
the boundaries. Finally, we have two conditions which ensure no bubble around
employment or unemployment:
lim
R→−∞
Ek(R) =
R
r
(33)
lim
R→+∞
E(R)
exp(R)
=
1
r − µj − σ2j /2
(34)
These equations ensure that for an arbitrarily low rent, the value functions
all converge to the value of moving to another neighborhood and if the rent
increases without bound then the value function converges to the value of living
in neighborhood j.
The no-bubble conditions (33) imply that all k : k 6= j in (26), uk = 0. Other-
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wise, the expected value of neighborhood j will diverge relative to other neigh-
borhoods as rent grows asymptotically large positively or negatively. Then, the
value functions will be, abusing notation slightly:
rEj(t)(R) =
exp(R)
r − µj(t) − σ2j(t)/2
+ u exp(λjR) (35)
with
λj =
−µj −
√
µ2j + 2rσ
2
j
σ2j
(36)
Then, we end up with 4N − 4 equations in the unknowns (uj ,R, R¯),∀j ∈
{1, . . . , N} from the conditions in (27). The values uj must be positive since it
is feasible to stay in one neighborhood forever or never arrive in that neighbor-
hood for all time.
These arguments collectively demonstrate that there exists a unique fixed
cost which optimizes the width of inaction R¯ − R. This section merely ex-
tended the initial argument of the base paper to an N -dimensional setting with
total equivalence across possible classes, rather than having an employment-
unemployment asymmetric value function. See Alvarez for more information on
this.
B Regression Summary Tables
B.1 Base Model
Dep. Variable: asymptotic duration R-squared: 0.138
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.110
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 4.978
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 Prob (F-statistic): 1.89e-12
Time: 17:16:49 Log-Likelihood: -1776.3
No. Observations: 706 AIC: 3599.
Df Residuals: 684 BIC: 3703.
Df Model: 21
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coef std err t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
C(city)[Atlanta] 0.9908 2.048 0.484 0.629 -3.030 5.012
C(city)[College] 2.2074 2.151 1.026 0.305 -2.016 6.431
C(city)[Los Ang] -0.9419 2.148 -0.439 0.661 -5.159 3.275
C(city)[New Orl] -5.8997 3.047 -1.936 0.053 -11.883 0.083
C(city)[New Yor] -2.0203 2.357 -0.857 0.392 -6.647 2.607
C(city)[Tampa] 0.1777 2.053 0.087 0.931 -3.853 4.208
C(year)[T.1998] -0.5781 1.335 -0.433 0.665 -3.200 2.044
C(year)[T.1999] -0.7332 1.353 -0.542 0.588 -3.390 1.923
C(year)[T.2000] -1.4647 1.269 -1.155 0.249 -3.955 1.026
C(year)[T.2001] -3.4705 1.246 -2.784 0.006 -5.918 -1.023
C(year)[T.2002] -1.9115 1.216 -1.572 0.116 -4.299 0.476
C(year)[T.2003] -2.6072 1.172 -2.225 0.026 -4.908 -0.306
C(year)[T.2004] -2.1911 1.152 -1.902 0.058 -4.453 0.071
C(year)[T.2005] -2.0074 1.140 -1.760 0.079 -4.247 0.232
C(year)[T.2006] -1.2788 1.137 -1.124 0.261 -3.512 0.954
C(year)[T.2007] -0.6642 1.142 -0.582 0.561 -2.907 1.578
C(year)[T.2008] -0.1897 0.390 -0.486 0.627 -0.955 0.576
C(year)[T.2009] -0.2031 0.388 -0.524 0.600 -0.964 0.558
C(year)[T.2010] -0.2920 0.386 -0.756 0.450 -1.050 0.466
C(treatment) 0.8125 0.472 1.721 0.086 -0.114 1.739
C(recession) -0.6848 0.832 -0.823 0.411 -2.318 0.949
DD 0.6184 0.837 0.738 0.461 -1.026 2.263
lrent 1.1841 0.272 4.346 0.000 0.649 1.719
Table 5: Table of coefficients for the model in (22). The basic difference-in-
difference estimator is denoted, “DD.”
Omnibus: 101.625 Durbin-Watson: 1.257
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 563.989
Skew: 0.496 Prob(JB): 3.40e-123
Kurtosis: 7.265
B.2 Model without Time Coefficients
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coef std err t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
C(city)[Atlanta] -1.8984 1.743 -1.089 0.277 -5.322 1.525
C(city)[College] -0.6772 1.854 -0.365 0.715 -4.317 2.963
C(city)[Los Ang] -3.7848 1.867 -2.027 0.043 -7.451 -0.118
C(city)[New Orl] -8.7279 2.877 -3.034 0.003 -14.376 -3.080
C(city)[New Yor] -4.9805 2.106 -2.365 0.018 -9.115 -0.846
C(city)[Tampa] -2.6470 1.761 -1.503 0.133 -6.104 0.810
C(treatment) 0.7074 0.476 1.485 0.138 -0.228 1.643
C(recession) 0.6736 0.264 2.550 0.011 0.155 1.192
DD 0.6999 0.847 0.826 0.409 -0.964 2.364
lrent 1.3635 0.261 5.228 0.000 0.851 1.876
Table 6: Table of coefficients for the model in (22) without time coefficients.
The basic difference-in-difference estimator is denoted, “DD.”
Dep. Variable: asymptotic duration R-squared: 0.100
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.087
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 7.705
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 Prob (F-statistic): 9.37e-12
Time: 17:59:37 Log-Likelihood: -1791.7
No. Observations: 706 AIC: 3605.
Df Residuals: 696 BIC: 3656.
Df Model: 9
Omnibus: 128.755 Durbin-Watson: 1.274
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 809.435
Skew: 0.646 Prob(JB): 1.71e-176
Kurtosis: 8.084 Cond. No. 296.
B.3 Model with Heterogeneity Controls
Dep. Variable: asymptotic duration R-squared: 0.119
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.104
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 7.994
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 Prob (F-statistic): 3.78e-13
Time: 18:01:03 Log-Likelihood: -1612.5
No. Observations: 664 AIC: 3249.
Df Residuals: 653 BIC: 3303.
Df Model: 10
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coef std err t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
C(city)[Atlanta] -0.0440 1.656 -0.027 0.979 -3.297 3.209
C(city)[College] 1.0109 1.743 0.580 0.562 -2.411 4.433
C(city)[Los Ang] -1.7796 1.778 -1.001 0.317 -5.272 1.713
C(city)[New Orl] -6.4528 2.654 -2.431 0.015 -11.664 -1.242
C(city)[New Yor] -3.0860 1.972 -1.565 0.118 -6.959 0.787
C(city)[Tampa] -0.9030 1.665 -0.542 0.588 -4.173 2.367
C(treatment) 0.5707 0.471 1.211 0.226 -0.355 1.496
C(recession) 0.4780 0.242 1.979 0.048 0.004 0.952
DD 0.7748 0.786 0.985 0.325 -0.769 2.319
lrent 1.3453 0.242 5.563 0.000 0.871 1.820
propvar -3.8544 1.005 -3.835 0.000 -5.828 -1.881
Table 7: Table of coefficients for the model in (22) without time coefficients
and an added term controlling for heterogeneity in neighborhoods. The basic
difference-in-difference estimator is denoted, “DD.”
Omnibus: 56.970 Durbin-Watson: 1.202
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 302.572
Skew: -0.026 Prob(JB): 1.98e-66
Kurtosis: 6.307 Cond. No. 303.
B.4 Two Stage Model
Dep. Variable: κ R-squared: 0.115
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.100
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 7.669
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 Prob (F-statistic): 1.56e-12
Time: 18:33:07 Log-Likelihood: -1309.7
No. Observations: 664 AIC: 2643.
Df Residuals: 653 BIC: 2697.
Df Model: 10
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coef std err t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
C(city)[Atlanta] -2.4593 1.050 -2.342 0.019 -4.521 -0.398
C(city)[College] -1.8884 1.105 -1.710 0.088 -4.057 0.281
C(city)[Los Ang] -3.1059 1.127 -2.755 0.006 -5.319 -0.892
C(city)[New Orl] -5.2551 1.682 -3.124 0.002 -8.558 -1.952
C(city)[New Yor] -4.3181 1.250 -3.454 0.001 -6.773 -1.863
C(city)[Tampa] -3.2019 1.056 -3.033 0.003 -5.274 -1.129
C(treatment) 0.0091 0.299 0.030 0.976 -0.577 0.596
C(recession) -0.2566 0.153 -1.676 0.094 -0.557 0.044
DD 0.8137 0.498 1.633 0.103 -0.165 1.792
lrent 0.3439 0.153 2.244 0.025 0.043 0.645
propvar 1.7055 0.637 2.677 0.008 0.454 2.957
Omnibus: 171.883 Durbin-Watson: 1.748
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 1023.804
Skew: 1.012 Prob(JB): 4.83e-223
Kurtosis: 8.736 Cond. No. 303.
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